«The Determinable-Determinate Relation Can’t Save Adverbialism Abstract Adverbialist theories promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a ...»
One might be thinking a specific thought or a non-specific thought and the trouble for Kriegel still goes through. Suppose John is thinking that there is a particular red square on his desk, the very square that he saw there when he left the house earlier today, say. Kriegel might aim to capture this as a particular-red-square-ly thinking. Thinking about a particular red square entails thinking about a particular square, so Kriegel will appeal to the determinatedeterminable relation for specific/particular thoughts. We can then run the line of argument in the main text that shows that the view demands too many thoughts of John. If, on the other hand, John thinks there is some or other red square on his desk, but he has no particular red square in mind, Kriegel might capture this as a red-square-but-none-in-particular-ly thinking.
But again, the same kind of inference to thinking about a square but none in particular is available, so Kriegel will hold that there are non-specific thoughts that stand in the determinable-determinate relation to one another too. We then run the now familiar objection.
The moral is that the problem for Kriegel’s view cross-cuts issues about specificity.
Grzankowski - draft room. Intuitively, I’m simply presented with blackness, but Kriegel’s view can’t make sense of this.
Ducasse, C. J. 1940. Propositions, opinions, sentences, and facts. Journal of Philosophy 37 (26):
Funkhouser, E. 2006. The determinable-determinate relation. Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
Goldstein, L. 1982. The adverbial theory of conceptual thought. The Monist 65 (3):379-392.
Hare, P. 1969. Propositions and adverbial metaphysics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):
Jackson, F. 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, W.E. 1921. Logic, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
Kriegel, U. 2007. Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
Kriegel, U. 2008. The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects. Philosophical Studies 141:
Kriegel, U. 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Prior, A. N. 1949. Determinables, determinates and determinants. Mind 58 (229):1-20.
Rapaport, W. J. 1979. An adverbial meinongian theory. Analysis 39 (March):75-81.
Sellars, W. 1969. Metaphysics and the concept of a person. in The Logical Way of Doing Things, ed. K. Lambert. Yale University Press.