«Workshop held 9-10 January 2008 in Arlington, VA Prepared for US Strategic Command Global Innovation and Strategy Center (USSTRATCOM/GISC) Prepared ...»
Religions are great for communications. You can’t stop religion and radical religions. (The spread of religion is) part of the quid pro quo of connectivity, everyone wants all the connectivity but not all the content. (This is not just true for religion, but for things like materialism and pornography. If connectivity is available, vested interests will seek to exploit it.) If you reach out to religions, you have to distinguish between the nations and super-nations. Globalization began in Europe with the rise of nation states, who expressed their power and exercised influence largely through colonial empires. Globalization via this colonial model was successful in North America, less so in Latin America. Hallmarking the gradual collapse of colonial model, North America emerged as a successor. The Far East was the next arena to arise thru the same model.
In the Middle East, who will be the agents of globalization? Most likely it will not be Europeans, nor Japanese, and while North Americans may seek to serve in this capacity, the potential for influence is limited due to the presence of the military as agents. In order to engage the Middle East and Africa in the globalized system, the agent of change will have to be capable of handling the tumultuous environment. Asia has profound demographic issues and has to deal with a far more rapid evolution to handle the transitions – they will be most in need of the job and resource markets in Africa. The Chinese and Indians will teach the Middle East and North Africa how to be Muslim and modern. The US can do only certain things with the military, some things with political and governance, but economics and infrastructure will come from India, China, and Malaysia.
Every culture has a concept of cosmos and chaos. Cyberspace and the Internet fit within this framework. Globalization defuses and cyberspace defuses. This is where some find their empowerment – particularly non-state actors who begin to try to wield power like states. When the leading edge comes into your area, the marginalized welcome it as power while national Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace entities tend to want to stop. Empowerment of the Internet is like this. As this edge spreads, we get more of the non-state actors – they see loosening of bonds – they don’t necessarily want to live in chaos forever. The sense of chaos is universal, but has a curve to it.
The Internet gives rise to universalist visions – transnational visions. We need to understand the larger context of universalist vision – how can the Internet, in breaking down national barriers and erasing geographical limitations, empower non-state actors?
We can monitor Internet traffic and have a vast window into the leadership class thought process (recognizing that there is denial and deception)… “if I can find fundamental times and links, I can manipulate them.” Related matters and general thoughts While the available tools can be used to gain tremendous insight into Internet power brokers, who they are and how they operate, caution must be exercised. Here’s an example of how quantitative techniques for assessing power relationships through e-mail can yield inaccurate results. During a fleet exercise, patterns of email were gathered to figure out the most important people in the network, where they were and what their patterns of usage were. The most important were defined as those that had most emails and sent most emails. That turned out to be the Chaplain. So they pulled the chaplain. Then the most important person was the N1 who was coordinating personnel. Some of the email accounts are positional, that is they were used by different people as shifts changed. N3 and N5 emerged after long analysis. Some thought that you should not take chaplain and N1 off network – it’s the best D&D available. Content networks don’t map on communications networks.
We Americans typically don’t want a relationship, we want a machine that handles our problem.
The tool builders are all about the people they are dealing with via cyberspace.
I have voice, video and data that can span the world in seconds. Relationship to me is amorphous – so you need to teach me to use the tools. Cyberspace can be used.
Generation Y is populating the military. What are the implications of deterrence for the next generation – what are they inheriting?
Here’s what you are going to be looking at – Apple will completely change the way the world works – every phone is going to be its own broadcasting unit. Direct and indirect communication will contribute to spheres of influence. Every phone is a TV station.
Relationships can be built without collusion in transit, perhaps even without any organizational influences.
Instantaneous communications is going to change things – it can be used to build relationships.
Consider not just broadcast to the whole world, but broadcast to a small world. Sociologically what emerges are small world networks – clusters with links to other clusters – maybe to religious scholars and their students. Recently, Islamists seem to have the edge in building their relationships, although US and Western youth seem equally adept.
Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace We can change aspects of behavior. Consider racism and sexism in the US – we haven’t changed our culture, but over a couple of generations we have changed these aspects of our behavior. Can we hold people to that behavior even when unintentional by setting the conditions? Not going after extremists, but those who can influence those who can be extremists.
This conversation has two threads: deter someone from doing something with cyber, deter someone from using cyber as a threat – and they are different. The two are related. Deterrence is not always direct. But is the issue about using cyberspace to influence or is it about deterring something specific with respect to cyberspace itself?
One approach is to focus on specific acts that you want to prevent or stop. For example, deter a non-state actor from violence.
If we gave 1000 Airmen a video camera and told them to post what they wanted to on a webpage, would that influence a kid to be recruited by Jihadists?
How do you see the effect of the Madrassas and the education push as influencing the size of the pipeline for Jihad? They can push it, but can’t create demand that isn’t there.
Madrassas are not spreading terror – they tend to be very standards oriented, but adhere more to a local standard. Setting international standards of behavior requires that they teach math science and language – there has likely been over-focus on Madrassas in the hinterlands where they taught rote religion and how to fire a gun. Madrassas are competing with public schools.
Perhaps the West can re-instill the legacy of the Middle East as a main keeper of some of the world’s intellect and history as it did in the Dark Ages throughout the rest of Europe.
In terms of exerting influence and establishing relationships, the information age is different than previous eras because it is no longer hierarchical in a traditional sense. How states influence non-state actors is only one component of the interactive relationships inherent in the cyber realm. In reality we want non-state actors/ organizations to influence other non-state actors/ organizations – deterrence in the cyber age may mean energizing non-state actors to self-deter.
To practice deterrence in a cyber world, we have to understand the former old world restrictions on who wields power and influence and move away from that traditional hierarchy. For example, with non-governmental groups, self-policing occurs due to the reality that harm affects all NGOs.
In the connected world, indirect connections are more powerful in the collective than direct connections.
What are the means to successful deterrence in cyberspace? One participant stated: I have yet to hear how you can deter behavior in cyberspace. To which another responded: because you can’t do it.
However, research is coming out now on how to influence in cyber world but it hasn’t gotten into textbooks as yet. This subject is currently widely debated and in need of further exploration.
Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace Wrap session We’ve extended the definition of deterrence to include influence. We should also include actions like deflection and redirection. Look for (potential) allies in populations we want to affect, and those who have similar goals, and support their efforts. Don’t just consider allies in a political sense, but all like-minded groups: NGOs, media, artists, pop culture (such as, for example, soap operas). The radicals have reached out; moderate groups should be supported in their out-reach efforts. Don’t cede the field to the radicals. Oppose messages that support suicide bombers with messages that discourage suicide bombing. Such are the thoughts behind Deterrence 2.0!
We should be similarly expansive in identifying the forms of media to exploit: digital and analogue. Build sustainable deterrence using digital and analog media.
So is “deterrence” the right terminology? Some think it would be a disaster, because it carries the imprint of DoD and the baggage of the cold war. The application of deterrence in the cold war had all the components; deterrence is our aim at what we are doing. The basic calculation in deterrence is cost-benefit. But “deterrence” carries a strong implication of compellence and coercion.
There are different domains to be considered. We need to deter specific acts, including criminal acts. For much of the rest that we have been discussing, the issue is wider, like leveling the idea space.
A way ahead is by enabling, empowering, and allying ourselves with people who are in some ways like minded. However, a public and overt process may not work in this case – public association with US may not be helpful. What we want is to empower with less overt action.
Concepts of cold war deterrence are largely the same as those concepts currently being discussed. The difference is whether actions taken are direct or indirect. In cyber deterrence with non-state actors, actions will require more indirect actions. Our presence in the cyber world should be friendly, welcoming to relationships. Our cyber profile would benefit from a shift in public perceptions.
A small percentage are out to kill and it’s that tiny minority that we are out to deal with and prevent the spread of their philosophy. There is an issue about whether we can influence a radical terrorist organization – less likely to change their mindset, but can still influence them, can influence that core element by influencing the sea in which they swim – although we believe they are winning, they are sure that we are winning because of the influence of globalization.
You have to have redirection measures because the youth want to act – give them something constructive to do: a tiny hard core minority is viewed as glamorous by too many and dissuasion is critically important. Cyberspace gives us opportunity to get many alternative messages out.
If someone is violently bent, fundamentally fixated, we may not be able to deter them from their view—but influence, especially indirect, may still be possible. In addition, although deradicalization may not be possible, the fence sitters and moderates may be susceptible to influence. The goal may be not to change the fence sitters way of thinking, rather to prevent the radicals from changing their views and swaying them to their side Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace This tiny radical group appears glamorous to the large group. There exist fault lines on the radical side that we can explore. We might be able to make them seem less glamorous.
Occidentalism/Globalization is so influential—it is impossible to undo this influence—and this is why in the eyes of people such as Osama Bin Laden we have won the cultural war.
Several participants pointed out that globalization has been changing the international
environment in a way that the radicals don’t like. Open news sources are an engine of that:
BBC, al-Jazeera. We may view al-Jazeera as providing a Muslim point of view, but the radicals see it as spreading information that undermines their cause. Radio Free Europe satisfied a similar demand during the cold war. (That model should be extended into the globalized cyberworld.) Today there is a demand for identity in a rapidly changing world. A central principle is (could be): core American values of professionalism, economic upward mobility, with a dose of piety.
We might encourage piety through non-violent Muslim clerics, support those who share values with us and oppose the radicals. Encourage economic upward mobility indirectly through our partners who have what the youth need – trade. Discover how to educate for professionalism and need partners to employ the newly created professionals (currently émigrés because of lack of opportunity).
An unconventional warfare campaign contains the exertion of influence at local levels— go right through the local establishments as the ones who receive support and use it directly – as opposed to going through a federal government.
Micro-targeting is not a new concept– but the tools are new, visibility on the Internet is ability to find and work with presences on line.
We could do things like find the websites that are most popular with Arab or Iranian youth (who speak English, or who are living in the US), and make those websites available in local languages. There is a huge expansion in the Arab language on the web and a huge lack of content in Arab language. We have to be careful to take into consideration the huge diversity in the Islamic world.
We need the open playing field of a relatively unconstrained Internet environment. How do we keep the Internet free and open? Promotion of open cyberism is a deterrence strategy.
However, doing so means that from time to time you will have a small group that uses the net to enable them to blow up a subway – we may have to tolerate the occasional violent act. We need the openness to mine the openness, we also need to solve our own stability and continuity - we have to have resiliency and continuity; this points to the need to have the appropriate network security – it will get worse on a case by case basis and the cyber security industry is in a hole and fighting an uphill battle.
We do better when everybody does better and it should be in our national strategy to provide it and defend the cyber world. One participant suggested that we could advocate a UN or some other international body to govern it.
Perhaps we can put this in some form of a query framework
1. how are our adversaries using the Internet and cyber media in general Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace
2. what do we do about that
3. how do we go beyond that We should have a better understanding of how we can use cyber tools to understand our environment on a persistent basis. In order to gain such insights, we need to look at the socialization process, forming of communities and effect of that type of organization and empowerment.
Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace
Deterring VNSA in Cyberspace MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus NEMESIS Network Modeling Environment for Structural Intervention Strategies NGO Non-Government Organization NSA Non-State Actor NSI National Security Innovations NYPD New York Police Department ODL Organizational Descriptive Language ORA Organizational Risk Analysis (tool from Carnegie Mellon University) OSD Office of Secretary of Defense PCA Principle Component Analysis (analysis algorithm) PNN Probabilistic Neural Networks (analysis algorithm) SMA Strategic Multi-layer Assessment SOA Service Oriented Architecture SOI Spheres of Influence SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (US Navy) SRC Syracuse Research Corporation STRATCOM Strategic Command SUNY State University of New York SVM Support Vector Machines (analysis algorithm) Terabyte = 240 bytes, approximately 1012 bytes TB USG US Government VNSA Violent Non-State Actor